Human Rights and Climate Change:
Shifting the Burden to the State? by Parsons, Anne
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 9
Issue 2 Winter 2009: Climate Law Reporter 2009 Article 8
Human Rights and Climate Change: Shifting the
Burden to the State?
Anne Parsons
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons
This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Parsons, Anne. “Human Rights and Climate Change: Shifting the Burden to the State?” Sustainable Development Law & Policy,
Winter 2009, 22, 68.
22wInTer 2009
human RightS anD climate change:  
Shifting the buRDen to the State?
by Anne Parsons*
*Anne Parsons is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University, Washing-
ton College of Law.
In March 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Council passed Resolution 7/23 requesting intergovernmental and international organizations to conduct “a detailed analyti-
cal study on the relationship between climate change and human 
rights.”1 Resolution 7/23 is indicative of the recent global trend 
that incorporates a human rights framework in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation policies.2 
Underlying the human rights approach to climate change is 
the notion that vulnerable populations that contributed little to 
the stocks of carbon emissions that cause global warming, should 
not have to bear the brunt of the burden in addressing global 
climate change.3 Correspondingly, protecting human rights 
will better enable individuals and communities to take steps to 
adapt on their own.4 Under a human rights framework, the state 
is traditionally the duty-bearer, and advocates of a rights-based 
approach to climate change urge governments to integrate cli-
mate change concerns into existing development policies and set 
minimum human rights thresholds around which new mitigation 
and adaptation policies can be developed.5 While the rights-
based approach to climate change raises many useful method-
ological insights, it also raises a fundamental question: how will 
states that currently lack the resources or political will to fulfill 
basic human rights tackle the problem of climate change?
The essential hope of orienting climate policy around human 
rights is that this orientation will generate moral and legal force 
within the global climate change regime.6 To start, it distin-
guishes between “perpetrators” of climate change and “victims” 
of climate change.7 This framing of the relationship has two key 
advantages from a human rights perspective. First, it highlights 
litigation as a viable mechanism for holding reluctant-to-change 
developed nations accountable to their climate change commit-
ments.8 Second, it also helps provide new impetus for wealthier 
nations to assist vulnerable states to adapt by providing resources 
and technology.9 For example, to date, few wealthy countries 
have met the agreed international aid target for adaption fund-
ing, which currently stands at 0.7% of Gross Domestic Prod-
uct.10 In contrast, one study estimated the financing needed for 
“immediate ‘climate proofing’” at between US$1.1 billion and 
US$2.2 billion for least developed countries.11 
At the national level, the logistics of implementing a rights-
based climate change policy are tricky. A rights-based approach 
to climate change takes universally accepted human rights 
norms as minimum thresholds by which to gauge the effects of 
climate change and direct adaptation funding to where it is most 
needed.12 At the same time, these thresholds ensure that the 
policies implemented by governments to address the effect of 
climate change do not themselves infringe upon human rights.13 
A recent total ban on charcoal in the West African country of 
Chad exemplifies the latter point: the government’s response 
to the pressing problem of deforestation has been widely criti-
cized as overly harsh by the public and human rights activists 
alike.14 Paradoxically, then, a human rights approach to climate 
change may be hardest to implement in the countries that need it 
most.15 If a government of a resource-poor state faces a pressing 
environmental concern, the state’s only viable option within the 
human rights framework may be to appeal to the international 
community for aid. 
Ultimately then, whether the human rights framework for 
climate change offers anything new to the states most vulnerable 
to climate change depends on those states’ ability to leverage 
this discourse in negotiations vis-à-vis the international com-
munity. This will require these states to invoke human rights 
discourses in new ways, since human rights have traditionally 
been concerned with the state-individual relationship.16 In the 
past, climate change negotiations have marginalized resource-
poor countries in need of adaptation funding.17 Resource-poor 
states may be able to invoke procedural rights (right to participa-
tion, right to information) as a means of gaining access to these 
negotiations.18 Similarly, asserting the right to development 
may help developing nations articulate their concerns about the 
impacts of climate change on their ability to protect their citi-
zens’ human rights.19 Integral to the human rights framework 
on climate change is the notion that powerful nations should 
recognize developing states’ right to actively participate in the 
development of a global strategy on climate change as both an 
ethical obligation and the only means of attaining a sustainable 
solution.
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